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FROM FEDERATION TO PARTY?
THE FORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
"political parties at the European level are important as a factor for integra-
tion within the Union. They contribute to forming a European aware-
ness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union:' The posi-
tion of political parties within the European political process was officially laid
down for the first time in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991. Leaving the curious
normative wording of this article apart - suggesting that these European par-
ties were expected to contribute to the formation of a positive European aware-
ness only - we will focus on the other parts of the Treaty article: with "parties at
the European level" and with the second task formally assigned to them since
the Treaty of Maastricht - namely, expressing the political will of voters in the
representative democracy that the European Union seeks to be.
In this contribution two questions will be addressed. Firstly, is it possible to
speak of parties at the European level in the same way that we do of parties
within national political systems? And secondly, how have these parties inter-
preted the representative role that they are expected to perform? First I will ex-
plain what I understand by Eurofederations and their representative function.
I will then outline the organizational evolution of the federations from their
origins in the mid-1970'S up to the present day, and will show how their role
has evolved. After that I'll take stock and draw some conclusions. It will come
as no surprise that the 'parties at the European level' are sui generis parties that
differ markedly in some respects from parties at the national level. We see this
for instance in their limited capacity to carry out their representative task as it
has been formally defined. And finally, I will address the question of what we
can attribute these deficiencies to, and how improvements could be made.
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A Eurofederation (or Europarty) in effect brings together an ideological fami-
ly of parties at the European level. It is not a homogenous organization, but a
reticular conglomerate of three structures: national member parties, the par-
liamentary group within the European Parliament and the transnational, extra-
parliamentary party organization, or to use the terms of political scientists Katz
and Mair, the 'party on the ground: the 'party in public office' and the 'party in
central office'.l The national parties are the 'parties on the ground' linking the
federation to society. The Eurogroup is the party 'in public office: representing
the federation in the European Parliament. The party 'in central office' is the
transnational party organization, the federation, which -like the group - is pri-
marily active at the European level. The federation overarches national member
parties and the parliamentary group, and it points out the political direction
- at least in theory.
Over the years relationships between these different structures have certainly
not always been stable and harmonious, and this is not very different today.
In order to indicate the degree of integration of the different components one
could use the scale developed by the German political scientist Niedermayer.
He distinguished basically three stages. At the first stage, national parties main-
tained merely ad hoc contacts with parties in other countries. In the second
stage, the co-operative stage, the cross-national relations are embedded in a
permanent trans-national organisational structure. In the third stage, the tran-
snational organisation has evolved into a supranational organisation which re-
stricts the the autonomy of the national organisations.2
The parties on the ground, in public office and in central office each contribu-
te in their own way to the federation's representative function. Here we will
focus on the transnational party organization. Although this has a degree of in-
dependent authority thanks to the partial transfer of sovereignty from member
parties to the transnational level, it cannot develop fully because of the lack of
co-operation from the same national parties.
There are different ways of interpreting the representative function of po-
litical parties. Some scholars confine it to the party's programme function - in
other words, the articulation and aggregation of voter preferences. Once these
views have been selected and prioritized, the party incorporates them into its
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liamentary group and members of the government - if there are any. In this
way, the preferences of the voters are brought into the political decision making
process. But we can also interpret the party's representative role more broadly
than simply structuring the substance of voter choice. It then includes activities
related to its programmatic function, such as running election campaigns and
recruiting candidates to expound or implement the party's position. Here is
chosen for the broader interpretation, which means, in addition to channelling
and combining voter preferences, also the recruitment and selection of political
personnel, the mobilization of voters and the shaping of policy. In brief, it refers










Political parties largely evolve in response to changes in their institutional en-
vironment. For example, the evolution of parliaments that controlled govern-
ment brought with it the formation of groups, and extending suffrage went
hand in hand with the rise of mass parties. This somewhat simplified institu-
tional mechanism also occurred at the European level. The process of European
integration dates back to the early 1950'S. In May 1950 Schuman proposed the
formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The Nether-
lands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, France and Germany became signatories
one year later, and in July 1952 the treaty came into effect. The 'Common As-
sembly' held its inaugural session in Strasbourg in September. This parliament
was charged with the political supervising of the executive body of the ECSC,
called the High Authority, and could force resignations where necessary. Al-
though the Common Assembly was composed on a national basis (the parlia-
ments of member states appointed representatives annually), ideological af-
finities proved stronger than national origins. Socialist, Christian Democrat
and liberal groups quickly formed, and were granted formal recognition in
June 1953, which entailed financial support to establish a permanent secre-
tariat, to convene meetings or to call in expert advice. They retained their legal
status and material assistance in the European Parliament, as the Common
Assembly has been called since 1958, following the Treaties of Rome in March
1957, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and European
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), beside ECSC. In fact, their position was
made even stronger: "all three of them enlarged their Bureau, developed their
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The Socialists - one of the most internationalistic inclined of all political fami-
lies - were the first to start some kind of European transnational cooperation.
Not long after the establishment of the ECSC in 1951, the Socialist Party Federa-
tion was founded. Socialist delegates from the six ECSC countries formed the
'Socialist Group' within the Common Assembly, with its own coordinating bu-
reau and permanent secretariat. In the run-up to the establishment of the EEC
and Euratom, the parties decided in 1957 to set up the Liaison Bureau of the
Socialist Parties of the European Community. Each party was represented in
the Bureau, which met several times each year. One of its functions was to draw
up recommendations and to keep affiliated parties informed about its work.4 It
also convened a congress every two years, attended by party representatives and
members of the Socialist Group and the liaison bureau. These regular, institu-
tionalized meetings ofMPs and party representatives were intended in principle
to promote the exchange of information and to coordinate socialist policies.s
Despite an energetic start, little came of this, however. And there were no ma-
jority decisions, since national parties were unwilling to relinquish any of their
power.
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II. The Prospect of European Elections and the Emergence
of Party Political Federations (1970'S)
Thus parliamentary groups preceded parties at European level. It was believed
that the process of party formation would not really get underway until the
European Parliament was directly elected by voters in the member states. The
ECSC treaty already opened the door for members of the Common Assem-
bly to be elected "by direct universal suffrage': The Treaties of Rome allowed
the Parliament itself to draw up "a uniform procedure for all member states"
for direct elections, although no timetable was set for doing so. Little came of
this as a result of inactivity or direct opposition from national governments.
In the 1960'S, European integration had reached an impasse, partly as a result
of French president De Gaulle's veto of the United Kingdom's application to
join the European communities, the extension of the powers of the European
Parliament, and the introduction of qualified majority voting (QMV) to take
decisions. All this meant that there was little incentive for national parties to
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Things changed after De Gaulle's departure in 1969. The European summit
of heads of state and government in The Hague in December of that year pro-
duced a breakthrough: they not only opened the door once more for enlarge-
ment, but also sought to increase the powers of the European Parliament and
to examine the modalities of direct European elections. In the early 1970'S, this
new impetus led to increased interest among national parties in transnational
cooperation. In December 1974 the Paris summit resolved to hold direct elec-
tions at the end of the decade, a decision that gave individual European party
associations in statu nascendi a powerful incentive to join forces more closely
- they would have to mobilize European voters and to act as a link between the
European electorate and European political institutions. Some had very high
expectations of the impact of direct European elections, like David Marquand,
a former British MP for Labour: "The Community's chances of moving beyond
the narrow limits of the present 'Europe des patries' depend crucially on the
emergence of a new kind of 'Europe des partis: in which the political forces that
matter at the national level are bound together by the need to fight for power at
the Community level. At present, such a Europe exists only in embryo, but no
one who has watched the preparations now being made for direct elections can
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With the prospect of direct European elections, the establishment of the Con-
federation of Socialist Parties of the European Community (CSPEC) in April
1974 marked a new phase in the process of federaliZing the Socialists. Although
little changed in an organizational sense, the affiliated parties lost something
of their formal autonomy in the new structure, as both the Bureau and the
Congress were now able to adopt majority decisions under certain conditions.
In practice, however, parties could choose to 'opt out' if they felt that their in-
terests were harmed. Hix and Lesse are of the view that the Confederation was
by no means a supranational party.? That had been made very clear in discus-
sions about the name of the organization: whereas Dutch Socialists argued for
'federation', their British counterparts would go no further than 'confederation'.
These differences reflected the divergent positions on the question of European
integration. Such internal division also threatened to jeopardize the drafting
of a joint programme for the European elections of 1979. However, the pro-
gramme was salvaged by party leaders at their Confederation summit held in
Brussels in June 1978. With an eye to the elections, the leaders decided on a
rather vague 'political declaration' and an 'appeal to the voter', and national
parties were granted the freedom to come up with their own programmes. This
intervention was an important precedent that "began the institutionalisation of
the socialist leaders' summits as the main decision-making body in the Con-
federation': 8
The first direct European elections had exposed the failure of the Confedera-
tion: too many member parties had been engaging in national campaigns with
national themes. It also became clear that the growing independence of the So-
cialist party group in the European Parliament required counterbalancing. This
led to a small-scale reorganization. Ties with the Euro-group were strength-
ened and the annual conference of party leaders was institutionalized. Later
it was decided that it would be held twice a year, immediately preceding the
European Council for Heads of State and Government. It was also laid down
by statute that the Confederation was to coordinate the position of the national
parties, which was a minor move towards supranationalism. At the same time,
the congress confirmed that the Confederation did not intend to grow into a
'European super-party' in which the member parties would have to surrender
part of their autonomy.
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All in all the socialists had shown themselves to be more energetic than their
liberal and Christian Democratic rivals, who had difficulties getting federa-
tion -based cooperation off the ground. In 1965, the loose alliance the Christian
Democrats had formed was transformed into the European Union of Christian
Democrats (EUCD).9 In 1970 the EUCD and the European Parliament Christian
Democratic Group moved to set up a so-called Standing Conference of the Six,
which would act as a liaison body between the chairs of the Christian Demo-
crat parties of the European Communities (EC) countries, their national par-
liamentary parties and their Members of European Parliament (MEPs). Now
federalization also started gaining momentum among Christian Democrats.
In 1972 this body became the Political Committee of the Christian Democratic
parties in the EC - the linchpin in the creation of a European party.1OTwo years
later the Bureau of the EUCD began actual preparations for establishing a tran-
1 summit held in
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snational organization. However, there were major differences of opinion about
fundamentals and the composition of the federation. With the aim of secur-
ing the key position for Christian Democrats in the European Parliament, the
German CDU and CSU wanted as broad as possible a coalition of Christian
Democrats and conservatives. Most other parties, however, wanted a purely
Christian Democratic federation - and hence the exclusion of non -Christian,
secular parties. The programmatic purists won the day, but lost the battle for
the name of the federation. Under pressure from the Germans, they opted for
the neutral label of European People's Party (EPP), which would make a broader
composition possible in the longer term. Although the party's subtitle - Fed-
eration of Christian Democratic Parties of the European Community - might
well have been an identity marker, it fell quickly into disuse.
The EPP was founded on 8 July 1976. The word 'party' showed its suprana-
tional aspirations, but according to Pridham this was initially by no means the
case.!! In its statutes the EPP affirmed a federal internal structure. Its political
bureau and biennial congress were able to take majority decisions, and election
programmes established in this way were binding on the national parties.!2 In
1983, after Kohl took office as German Chancellor, the EPP began convening
conferences of the leaders of the Christian Democrat party and government in
preparation for meetings of the European Council. This body gradually grew
in importance as it went along, leading - according to observers - to an "ero-
sion of the democratic decision-making process and a clouding of the political
debate by national interests':!3
Despite apparent supranational and centralist tendencies, the national parties
would have largely retained their independence as the EPP's statutes recognized
"their identity and their freedom of action within the framework of their na-
tional responsibilities': 14 According to Swedish political scientist Johansson, "it
is still national politicians and parties that have the final say on EPP programs
and positions': 15 The EPP leadership took this into account by seeking consensus
wherever possible rather than by settling every issue by majority decision. For
this reason, the British political scientist Hanley saw the EPP as an organization
that brought the national parties together in a loose coalition. "Co-ordination
is a more useful concept for understanding the EPP than supra-nationalism. It
seems to us idle to refer to the EPP as a 'superparty' on transnational lines': 16
The EPP was the underdog in the relationship with the Christian Democratic
group in the European Parliament. Firstly, it depended on them not only finan-
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party. 10 Two years
stablishing a tran-
cially, but also in terms of personnel. Furthermore, the Christian Democratic
MEPs were quite well represented in EPP bodies, including in its political bu-
reau.1? Moreover, because most member parties did not normally send their
key politicians as representatives to the EPP executive, they remained in the








In the early 1970'S, Liberal International (set up in 1947), consisting predomi-
nantly of European parties, endeavoured to promote cooperation and com-
munication between the liberal parties of the EC nations. However, the idea of
creating a permanent regional federative organization under the umbrella of
the International was soon abandoned. In 1973 liberal party leaders decided
to set up a separate European association of their parties. They played a major
role in the process of federalization, becoming - in Hrbek's view - "the driving
force towards the establishment of a transnational party organisation': 18 The
Federation of Liberal and Democratic Parties of the European Community (ab-
breviated to ELD)was launched in March 1976. The word 'Democrats' had been
added because not all affiliated parties wished to call themselves liberals.19 In
1986, after a few parties from Mediterranean countries had joined, the ELD
changed its name to Federation of European Liberal, Democratic and Reform
Parties (ELDR). From the outset, the Federation's internal cohesion suffered as
a result of its broad political heterogeneity, with some affiliated parties posi-
tioned in the political centre, and others further to the right - and sometimes
belonging to the same country.
The Liberal Group within the European Parliament played a fairly minor role
in establishing the ELD, partly because of its long history of internal politi-
cal diversity. In a financial and organizational sense, however, it was central to
the expansion of the liberal federation.20 That relationship of dependence also
prevented the ELDfrom shaping the political position of the Liberal Group, as
had originally been intended, yet not formalized in the statutes. In practice,
however, the MEPs held the upper handY
Although the term 'federation' - as opposed to 'party' - was explicitly chosen
when the ELDwas founded, its statutes, congress and executive committee were
empowered to adopt (qualified) majority decisions (of two- thirds of the vote). 22































parties, and "there are often cases where a party finds itself in a minority posi-
tion and outvoted': In practice, the affiliated parties, all of which set great store
by their independence, usually tried to reach consensus.23 The ELD also had su-
pranational powers in other areas. For example, it was supposed to approve the
national candidate lists for the European elections (although this never in fact
happened).24 The ELD parties were also obliged to work with the jointly drafted
programme during the campaign for these elections.
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In addition to these federations, several others emerged, although surprisingly
not involving the communists, in many respects perhaps the most internation-
ally oriented of parties. Ideological disagreement relating to 'Eurocommunism'
stood in the way of close cooperation between the French and Italian commu-
nist parties - the largest in Western Europe. The conservatives, on the other
hand, who had never favoured international party structures of a cooperative
kind, did manage to create their own association. In April 1978, almost two
years after the creation of the EPP, the European Democratic Union (EDU) was
established, involving even a few Christian Democratic parties. The genesis of
the EDU ran parallel to that ofthe EPp.25The German and Austrian Christian
Democrats and the British Conservatives were the driving force behind it. The
latter hoped that the EDU would help them to break out of their isolation in the
European Parliament. The other parties that made up the EPP, which saw the
EDU primarily as a rival organization, were in general not amused. The EDU
was no more than a rather loose coalition of parties (some from outside the
Ee): the British Conservatives' antipathy to any kind of supranational organi-
zation, for example, precluded any closer association. For this reason, nothing
came of a joint programme in the 1979 European elections.
For nationalist and regional parties too, international cooperation does not
seem to be the obvious step. Nevertheless, with an eye to the European elec-
tions, they too joined forces. The disappointing results led to the formation of
the relatively loose organised 'European Free Alliance' (EFA) in 1981. Unlike
other federations, they could not fall back on the support of a strong, like-
minded parliamentary group. The chief objective of the parties affiliated to the
EFA is full or partial autonomy for their regions. The Federation was able to de-







Together with the Greens, the EFAformed the Rainbow Group in the European





































In the run-up to the 1979 elections, the Greens were barely able to organize
any kind of cooperation. It took them until late 1980 before they proceeded
to establish the 'Coordination of Green and Radical Parties in Europe', which
also took on board parties that were not considered to be truly ecological. This
inherent contradiction led to a rift. In the autumn of 1983, the European Green
Coordination (EGC) was established, also called the European Greens. With
its congress, executive board and unanimity rule in decision-making matters,
the organizational model of the EGCwas to a large degree similar to that of the
other transnational federations, although it was more decentralized. In contrast
with the other federations, in which the parliamentary group had an important
role to play right from the party's establishment, the foundation of the EGC
was also predicated on the wish to establish a common group in the European
Parliament, which was also expected to raise revenues. Just like the other fed-
erations, the EGC did indeed receive organizational and, especially after 1989,
substantial financial support from the EP-group. There was no talk of the party's
political leadership of the groups. The EGC drafted programmes for the 1984
and 1989 elections, which were not taken very seriously by the party group or
by the member parties. This changed after 1989, when the programme began
to playa more directive role.27
The expectation that the first direct European elections in 1979 would see the
genesis of a political arena at the European level, in which the federations would
playa role that was clearly marked and recognizable to the electorate, failed to
come true. "The EP elections were fought in the nation states, by the national
parties, with national candidates and on national issues."28Voter turnout for
the first European elections was low, and even lower for the next elections in
1984. Nor did these elections boost the development of the federations in a
supranational direction. On the one hand, this had been due to the relative im-
potence of the European Parliament: it was generally felt that, if the federations
wanted to reinforce the strength of their positions, the competences of ParHa-
ment needed to be considerably enlarged. On the other hand, this stagnation
was also related to the wide-ranging internal political diversity of the federa-
tions, despite the fact that within the European Uion they tied together parties
from the same ideological family in a single organizational unit. The socialists
had rather widely diverging views on European integration and, hence, on the
degree to which their European federation had been organized supranation-
ally. The Christian democrats had a fundamental difference of opinion about
cooperation with the conservatives, and the liberals were divided not only on
European integration but also on the degree to which the government could
intervene in economic life.
This political heterogeneity, which had virtually found its symbolic expres-
sion in the quest for names when these three federations were established in the
mid-1970'S, was to persist into the next decade.29 The joint election programmes
in 1984 and 1989 which the federations had been able to draft, tended to be
rather flat and non-committal for the sake of unity, which as a rule did not
stop some member parties from distancing themselves from some items on the
programme anyway. In addition to the joint manifesto, parties also commonly
drafted an election programme of their own for their national grassroots.30 In
spite of all this, cohesion in the 1980'Simproved, more so in the EPP than among
the socialists because the British and Danish member parties, then as now, did
not care much for European integrationY Within the ELD, however, views grew
even further apart, particularly on economic policies and nuclear armament.32
The federations' capacity for decisive action was held back not only by diverg-
ing political and ideological differences but also by their organisational waek-
ness and their far-reaching dependence on the parliamentary groups for their
funding, staffing and accommodation. The federations were largely bolstered
by the Euro-groups' financial support. Federation staff were not uncommonly
on the parliamentary groups' payroll, and virtually all of them were put up in
European Parliament offices. Things being as they were, it was particularly dif-
ficult for the federation to guide -let alone manage - the parliamentary groups'
work. MEPs tended to listen more to member parties or to the Eurogroup lead-
ership than to the federation; after all, that was where they were dependent on
for re-election and for their parliamentary career. The federations were also
having considerable difficulty running the show because intenSifying parlia-
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to produce points of view in a very short time on a wide array of - often entirely
novel - issues. This often left the federation sidetracked.
In the terms of Niedermayer, in this period the federations were in the co-
operative stage: through transnational co-operation the national parties hoped
to enhance their influence at the European level. They performed some of the
election -related functions, such as drafting joint election programmes and co-
ordinating national election campaigns. Compared with political parties at a
national level, their functions were very limited - for example, they had no say
in the recruitment of candidates. As a result, their organizational structure was
weak. 'Confederation' might have been a more appropriate name than 'federa-
tion'. Although a few formally took internal decisions based on some kind of
majority voting, in practice decisions were taken mostly on the basis of una-
nimity, because most member parties were not prepared to relinquish any of
their sovereignty.
nothing was ~













In the early 1990'S the federations entered into a new phase, once again thanks
to new opportunities arising out of growing widening and deepening of the Eu-
ropean integration. On the one hand, the downfall of communism in Eastern
Europe and the future membership of countries behind the former Iron Cur-
tain opened up the possibility of many new member parties for the federations.
European integration also intensified. From 1987 onwards, successive treaties
had strengthened the supranational character of the EC, in particular because
the European Council of Ministers could increasingly take decisions based on
qualified majority voting and because the powers of the European Parliament
were extended. This in turn made the federations stronger, as demonstrated by
their formal recognition in the Treaty of Maastricht. At their insistence, and
for the first time in a European treaty, a formal reference to the transnational
European parties was included and their importance acknowledged (see the
quotation at the beginning of this contribution). On the one hand, the federa-
tions needed to promote awareness within the Union (by bringing it closer to
voters) and on the other to represent citizens in the European political arena.
The clear assumption was that the federations would thereby strengthen the
bond between citizens and the European Union, and hence increase the Union's




















nothing was said for instance about financial support for the European parties
or their role in the European elections.33 This recognition had no legal implica-
tions and was therefore primarily symbolic, but still a substantial step ahead.
The way in which the Europarties (as they will be called from now) had suc-
ceeded in including the article on the 'parties at the European level' within
the Maastricht Treaty was illustrative for their attitude in the 1990'S:more and
more they became focussed on influencing the European polical agenda. In the
main Europarties conferences of national party leaders (frequently also heads
of government in the case of the christian democrats and social democrats),
preceding the meetings of the European Council, were institutionalized. These
conferences were also attended by the most prominent political associates
within the ED institutions. The creation of this forum of national party leaders
was linked to the restriction of the power of national veto within the European































In November 1993, the Confederation of Socialist Parties of the European
Community was renamed Party of European Socialists (PES). This appeared
to be taking the socialists down the road to supranational party formation: the
principle of majority voting was introduced into those areas where it had also
been applied by the European Council since the 1987 Single European Act.
Its efficacy, however, was restricted immediately by allowing member parties
recourse to a statutory opt-out clause. As a consequence, consensus-building
remained the guiding principle within the PES.35 In essence, the PES remained a
'party of parties: not in the least because the option of individual membership
had been rejected in 1992, when the British Labour Party, among others, feared
this would have negative consequences for the national party.
The PES made a particular effort to promote and harmonize member party
collaboration. Party leader meetings, for instance, which had been customary
for some time, were institutionalized, as were those of specialist ministers in
1996; working groups dealing with specific political themes were given greater
prominence by bringing together experts from member states; and relations
with fellow party members in other European bodies were strengthened. For
example, meetings between socialist members of the European Commission
and the PES parliamentary groups' leadership were formalized in 2001. Coope-
ration in matters of policymaking and programming was also intensified, with
less of an exclusive focus on the European elections and greater consideration
for the socialist contribution to Council meetings and inter-governmental con-
ferences with a view to influencing the European agenda.36
In the late 1990'S, the PES also undertook to improve its exposure to members
of the various member parties and to consolidate its positioning within the
member parties. The PES organized meetings in the member states, had its logo
displayed on campaign materials and member party websites, and attempted
to have the European alliance embedded in member party statutes. What also
changed was the way in which member parties appointed their PES congress
delegates. This used to be a task for the party leadership, but in 1997 the Dutch
Labour Party (PvdA) congress decided to elect part of the Dutch delegation to
the PES congress, which would strengthen their mandate.37 After 1999, the PES
congress convened less frequently, which led to the introduction of a Council



















Just like the PES, the EPP also went through some organizational changes in
the 1990'S, aiming to improve mutual coordination and make decision-making
more efficient. The most important innovation was the EPP summit, instituted
in 1995. This body consisted of the EPP presidency, heads of government, party
leaders in coalition governments, chairs and deputy chairs of the European
Commission and (possibly) the European Parliament, and the chair and sec-
retary of the EPP group in the European Parliament. If necessary, the Christian
democrat opposition leaders were also invited. The summit replaced the "con-
ference of party leaders and heads of government", which had been established
in 1983. At the same time, the so-called Council was instituted, a body con-
sisting of chairs and secretaries of the EPP and the member parties, as well as
the Euro commissioners. These bodies would often convene on the same day,
in preparation for European Council meetings, in order to align their points
of view. Their main functions was coordinating diverging party positions and
consensus-building, in order to be politically more effective.38
The supranational character of the EPP was somewhat reinforced in the
1990S, with majority voting procedures being used more frequently after 1992,



















continued to be a general pursuit. In this period, individual membership was
introduced.40 The EPP also undertook to involve the national parties more in
European affairs in other ways. Participation in EPP congresses, for instance,
which used to be restricted to the party elites of national member parties, was
opened up to regional party organizations.
Pressurized by the strongly anti-socialist German Christian democrats, who
were out to expand the EPP's position in the European political process, the EPP
conducted a vigorous expansive strategy. In the 1990'S, it admitted parties that
could not be considered Christian democratic at all, such as the Spanish Partido
Popular or the Italian Forza Italia. The British and Danish conservative MEPs
closely cooperated with the EPP-group within the European Parliament. Those
with strictly orthodox positions in the EPP,who had come out victorious in the
1970'S, now tasted defeat. Membership of conservative parties had of course
consequences for the identity and the programme of the EPP.As a consequence
of its more conservative course, a merger with the conservative EDU was self-
evidentY After the 1999 European elections they established a joint group. So
as to appease the British Tories, the phrase "European Democrats" was added to




























In December 1993, the ELDR replaced the term 'federation' in its name for
'party' and was henceforth called the European Liberal, Democratic and Re-
form Party (ELDR)Y Just before that, decision-making procedures had also
been modified: instead of requiring qualified majorities, decisions could be
taken with ordinary majorities. In principle, this meant that member parties
relinquished some autonomy to the European party alliance. According to the
Swedish political scientist Sandstrom, the new procedure was little used at first:
"The newly created party would still use negotiations as the primary method of
reaching common decisions, emphasizing the confederal composition of the
ELDR"YMajority decision-making, however, would gradually be used more
and more frequently, also on more politically sensitive issues, which, in a way,
made the ELDRmore supranational.44 Others, like the former ELDR-secretary
general Wijsenbeek, are critical. Individual membership, however, proved to
be too high a hurdle, as a majority of member parties feared that this would
imperil the national party organizations.
In the 1990'S, the organizational structure of the ELDRwas also modified. A
new body was created between the congress and the board: the Council. This
body, representing all member parties, convened more frequently than the con-
gress. Owing to the increased competences of the European Parliament and the
ELDR's wish to coordinate their member parties' positions prior to European
Council meetings, mutual contacts under the ELDRbanner greatly increased.
Informal party leader consultations were formalized in 1995. These meetings
were commonly attended by the liberal Euro commissioners and Ministers for
Foreign Affairs. The relationship between the parliamentary group and the Eu-
roparty changed formally: the statutes specified that the group should represent
the ELDRin the European Parliament, which somewhat restrained the autono-
mous position of the MEPs.
After the 1990'S, finally, ties with the member parties were strengthened. The
'national' party secretaries met under the ELDRbanner, representatives of the
Europarty stepped up their visits to national party meetings, and national par-
liamentarians visited their groupin the European Parliament. The ELDRlogo ap-
peared increasingly on member party publications. In this period the debate about
the introduction of individual membership also started, this may also be con sid-































Just like the other TNFs, the EGCalso went through a reshuffle in the early 1990'S
to accommodate the Green parties that had sprung up in Eastern Europe. In
June 1993 the EGC was reformed into the more tightly organized European
Federation of Green Parties (EFGP). In contrast with its precursor, decisions in
EFGP bodies were taken on a qualified majority basis. Nevertheless, its statutory
wording allowed some leeway to the member parties. This led the German po-
litical scientist Dietz to conclude that the EFGPcould not be considered a truly
European party: "The point has not yet been reached when decisions taken by
majority voting are truly accepted and executed by all member parties. Only
in that way would their autonomy and their veto power be reduced':45 EFGP
membership was only open to parties, not to individuals.
Relations with the parliamentary group, which had improved after 1989, re-
mained relatively good within the EFGPstructure. For instance, it was decided












revision of established group points of view. However, the parliamentary group
was not accountable to the EFGP. The separation of the group and the EFGP
board hampered their mutual political harmonization. The EFGP's clout was








Unlike the other four Europarties, the member parties of the EFAdid not partici-
pate in national governments and therefore could not influence the EDdecision-
making bodies (Council and Commission). As a consequence, the Alliance did
not held convene party leaders conferences preceeding meetings of the European
Council. In 2000, however, the EFAfor the first time organized a conference for




Partly as a consequence of the formal establishment of "political parties at the
European level" in the Treaty of Maastricht, the Europarties became more self-
confident. This was reflected symbolically in the fact that most began calling
themselves 'parties' rather than 'federations: Their increased self-assurance was
also expressed in a more pronounced political stance. Instead of focusing pri-
marily on framing programmes and mobilizing the electorate, as they had done
since 1979, the Europarties began concentrating in the 1990'S on policy formu-
1ation and on influencing the political agenda of the European Union.
This shift in emphasis prompted adaptations to the organizational structure
of the three largest Europarties. The most important reform was the institution a-
lization of meetings between national party leaders (frequently also heads of
government in the case of the EPP and PES) and their most prominent allies
within the European Union in the early 1990'S. The purpose of this body was to
arrive through consultation at a joint position for heads of government in the
European Council, in order to expand its political influence.47 The creation of
this forum, however, led to a degree of centralization and reduced accountabi-
lity within the Europarties. This was because party leaders were not statutorily
accountable to the Congress, the highest body of the Europarties, but at most
to their own party congress.











introduction of the Council, which convened more frequently than the con-
gress. As the political function of the Europarties became stronger, their or-
ganization became increasingly complex, which was also reflected in a greater
number of working groups, whose task it was to prepare some aspects of their
political and policy positions.48
For most Europarties the transition - at least nominally - from federation
to party meant adjusting their internal decision-making processes. Those who
had not done so yet, also introduced the majority vote principle into their in-
ternal decision -making processes. In this way, they arrived at the supranational
integration stage distinguished by Niedermayer, at least in theory. However,
the practice was not truly supranational, at least outside the EPP, because not
only the search for consensus tended to remain the guiding principle of the
Europarties, but also because member parties usually had the formal option of
withdrawing from a majority decision. The actual, effective transfer of sover-
eignty from member parties to the transnational level thus remained limited,
also because party leader meetings do not take decisions on a majority basis.
After asserting themselves more in the European political arena, the most
important Europarties in any event sought to strengthen their ties with their
rank and file - the national member parties - and to raise their profile among
party members. From the end of the 1990'S they focused specifically on mem-
ber parties, including below the level of the national party elite. The EPP, for
example, sought to increase the involvement of regional party organizations
in its activities, while the PES tried to ensure that national delegations were
not appointed (exclusively) by the party leadership, but were (also) elected by
the party congresses. A logical sequel would have been to introduce individual
membership, but for many that was a step too far.
Europarties thus evolved in the late 1990'S into organizations with a more
pronounced political stance and more functions. They no longer focused solely
on drawing up election programmes and - to a lesser degree - mobilizing vot-
ers, but also on influencing EDdecision-making. And they became increasingly
involved in common policy-making. Thanks to the more co-ordinated activities
of party leaders, the Europarties were able to seize somewhat more of the initia-
tive in their relationship with the Eurogroups. However, their position always
remained secondary, partly because the relationship of material dependence on
the Eurogroups in terms of office space, staff and funding remained unchanged.





















































The Europarties were most disappointed that recognition in the Treaty of
Maastricht did not extend to financial support. In order to properly carry out
their tasks in the European political process (to which the Treaty of Maastricht
alluded), it was entirely logical that the Europarties should be given funding -
certainly bearing in mind the increasing costs due to the geographical scale on
which they were expected to operate. However, despite discussions on this mat-
ter, the Treaty of Amsterdam, concluded in October 1997, brought no changes.
In 2000 the leaders of the five largest Europarties urged the drawing up of a
party statute containing a financial regulation. This was prompted in part by
growing criticism of the way in which the large Europarties in particular were
supported financially and in other ways by their Eurogroups.49 In 2000 five to
ten percent of the 35 million euros in EU funding received by the groups went
to the Europarties. The European Parliament itself also pressed for regulations
to promote financial transparency.
The Treaty of Nice, concluded in 2001 and coming into effect in 2003, an-
nounced a statute of political parties at European level. Article 191 reiterated
the words of the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties but added the following:
"The CounciL .. shall lay down the regulations governing political parties at
European level and in particular the rules regarding their funding': 50It was not
until November 2003 - so half a year before the European elections onune 2004
- that the European Parliament and the European Commission established "the
regulations governing political parties and rules regarding their funding at Eu-
ropean level".51Europarties wishing to be eligible for EU funding needed to at
least have legal personality, and have participated in elections to the European
Parliament (or have expressed the intention to do so). Moreover, they had to
be represented in supra-local parliamentary bodies in at least a quarter of the
member states, or to have gained in at least a quarter of the member states no
less than three percent of the votes cast in each of those states during the most
recent elections for the European Parliament. Their programmes and actions
had to respect the fundamental principles of the European Union ("freedom,
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as the
constitutional state"). They were obliged to provide a statement of all donations
above EUR 500 and were not permitted to receive anonymous donations, mon-

















more than EUR 12,000. EU funding could only be spent on "administrative ex-
penses, expenses associated with logistical support, meetings, research, cross-
border events, studies, communications and publications':
The party statute had a major impact on the Europarties, in particular be-
cause of the explicit stipulation that "donations from the budgets of political
groups in the European Parliament" were no longer permitted. Because the
Europarties could also claim funding from the European Parliament, they now
became more autonomous - in a financial sense at least - although in terms of
resources they still lagged much behind the Eurogroups. At the same time, the
statute regulated the financial relationship between the Europarties and the
member parties. It was stated that the former should not use the granted fund-
ing "to fund, either directly or indirectly, political parties at national level".
The decision to switch to funding political parties (a total ofEUR 10.6 million
euro in 2008) had major implications for the European party system. The fact
that the EFGP renamed itself the European Green Party (EGP) was a relatively
minor change. More far-reaching was the creation of several new Europar-
ties. 52 In addition to the five discussed in this article, these were predominantly
eurosceptic and eurocritical groups, such as the Party of the European Left
(comprising left-socialist, and present and former communist parties), the Al-
liance ofIndependent Democrats in Europe, the EUDemocrats, and the Alli-
ance for Europe of the Nations. The European Democratic Party was the only
new Europarty to embrace European integration. This increase ment greater
opportunities at the European level for the expression of the political will of
citizens.
The funding regulation thus created its own dynamic, not only with regard
to the number of beneficiaries, but also in relation to newly funded organiza-
tions. In December 2007 "European political foundations" became eligible for
financial support (amounting to about 5 million euros). They have to promote
debate about Europe and to involve citizens in this dialogue, and are expected
to play their part in boosting the representative role of the Europarties. All
large Europarties quickly set up a foundation, which usually took the form of a
network of member party think tanks. The foundations assist the Europarties
with underpinning and developing policy, which might theoretically improve
their position vis a vis the Eurogroups.
During this period the Europarties pressed ahead with their efforts - out-




































their supporters within member parties and beyond. The ELDR introduced in-
dividual membership (but was not able to translate it into practice); the EGP
registered those who were interested as 'supporters' (which some 1.300 did).
Some Europarties organized campaigns in between elections to reach a broader
audience. In 2005 the PES launched the 'Social Europe Initiative', intended as a
dialogue between politicians and voters. The Greens began a campaign in the
European Union against climate change, using the same slogans and posters
in different countries. The EFA also ran a campaign in several countries under
the same slogan. In doing so, the Europarties not only drew their existence to
the attention of a wider audience, but also further shaped their own identities.






























Since the end of the 1970'S the principal functions of the Europarties have been
the articulation and aggregation of voter preferences in the first place, and to a
lesser extent the mobilization of voters. New tasks have been added over time.
In the 1990'S greater emphasis was given to formulating common policy, agen-
da-setting and actively influencing in a co-ordinated way the outcomes of the
European Council. More recently, there have been attempts to broaden public
support by integrating subnational units of member parties and individual citi-
zens within the organizational context of the Europarties.
Although Europarties have acquired a broader range of representative roles, in
general they have achieved only limited success in carrying out these tasks. This
does not concern so much their bigger focus on processes of common policy-
making. Here, Europarties have succeeded somewhat in raising their political
profile and improving their ability to set agendas. The advent of affiliated poli-
tical foundations might reinforce this trend. The Europarties have also proved
effective at co-ordinating the views of party and government leaders to enable
them to influence the decision -making processes of the European Council.
As opposed to these relative successes, the Europarties' role of mobilizing
voters has left much to be desired. The average turnout in the European elec-
tions was 63% in 1979, falling continuously to less than 46% in 2004. Opinion
polls show that elections have by no means narrowed the gap between the Eu-
ropean Union and the European public. Various things can also be said about
the articulation and aggregation roles. Although the large Europarties have
orts - out-
file among
at least drawn up election programmes for each election, these are viewed by
many as exceedingly vague. What is more, the fact that many member parties
also produce their own manifestos as a matter of course has damaged the status
of the joint programmes.
Before we will answer the question how these ambivalent results can be ex-
plained, we will first sum up the organizational development of Europarties in
the past thirty years. Here we can detect a clear trend. Europarties have pro-
gressed beyond the stage of contact and co-operation on Niedermayer's scale.
Almost all have begun calling themselves 'parties' in the wake of the Treaty of
Maastricht, although this doesn't mean that they have become fully-fledged
and fully integrated party organizations in Niedermayer's sense, which entails
among other things individual membership and internal decision-making in
accordance with the principle of majority voting. While the principle has for-
mally been introduced in most Europarties, this has usually amounted to very
little in practice, except perhaps for the EPP. When real issues are at stake, seek-
ing consensus is often still the norm, for the simple reason that member par-
ties do not wish to abandon their influence on essential matters in favour of a
supranational body that can overrule them. Member parties are also reticent
about individual membership. They are afraid it will promote the supranational
structure of the Europarties and undermine their pivotal national role within
these organisations.
"Genuinely integrated European parties would require a further transfer of
'sovereignty' from national parties'; according to Johansson, and that's just what
member parties are afraid of.54Member parties are willing to use the Europar-
ties and let them carry out certain tasks at the European leven when they ex-
pect to benefit from it. Examples are the establishment of Eurogroups in the
European Parliament (without them the national parties would not have much
influence at all) and the meetings of party leaders which exercize influence on
the agenda of the European Council. The institutionalization of these meetings
was regarded as a sign of revitalization of the Europarties, but in practice they
are hardly more than intergovernmental meetings between national party lead-
ers which are not accountable to any federal body. 55
A larger intermediary role for the Europarties in the linkage-process between
citizens and political elite of the Union might be more difficult to swallow by
the member parties as it would weaken their own position. The individual





































as long as these members have no voting rights. Also at the European elections
the Europarties playa very modest part. It is paradoxical that they were set
up with an eye to direct European elections, but that national member parties
have then gone on to virtually dominate the European electoral process up till
now. After all, they recruit the parliamentary candidates, relatively often draw
up their own election programmes and force the election campaigns into a na-
tional context. This 'nationalisation' leads to a distortion of the representative
mechanism: the MEP's represent the electorate in the European political arena
on the basis of nationally determined voter preferences.
This problem could be at least partly solved by granting Europarties, after
thirty years, a more central procedural position within the European electoral
process. This can be achieved fairly simply by having a portion of the MEP's
elected by means of transnational, Union-wide candidate lists drawn up by
the Europarties. This would strengthen the Europarties' positions in that they
themselves would also have to draw up candidate lists - thus also strengthening
their position vis it vis the MEPs. The Europarties themselves would conduct
campaigns in all member states on European issues, which should also give
more meaning to their European election programmes. Thus the election con-
test would acquire a stronger European character, certainly if it was also perso-
nalized by having the European Parliament nominate and appoint the chair of
the European Commission after the elections. The Europarties would benefit
from this, since they would have to put forward candidates for this position,
which would give them also the opportunity to engage citizens or individual
members in the nomination process. All in all, the link between the European































Clearly, the Europarties are not yet able to articulate the political will of the
citizens very well, as demanded by the Treaty of Maastricht and also the Treaty
of Lisbon. The question is whether they are to blame for this themselves. Ob-
viously, the political system of the European Union is very different from a
national political system. As the Italian political scientist Bardi put it: 'even if,
for analytical purposes, we consider the EC a fully autonomous political system,
then the most important institutional condition for political party develop-
ment, the centrality of parliament, does not pertain'. After all, there is no Euro-
pean government dependent on a majority in the European Parliament. As a
consequence, the power of a Europarty is still rather limited.
The future of the Europarties depends on the possibility of fulfilling their
intermediary and representative function in a more substantial way. Here they
depend on the national parties, directly and indirectly. Indirectly: the national
parties determine the direction of European integration through their repre-
sentatives in various European institutions, which in turns determines the de-
velopment of the Europarty. The institutional innovations mentioned earlier
(pan-European lists, election of the chair of the European Commission) could
improve the representative function of the Europarty.
At the same time, the member parties can exercize direct influence on the
structure of the Europarty. 'National parties remain the "gatekeepers" on tran-
snational party activity: in the words of the British political scientist Ladrech.56
Europarties depend on their goodwill- which was so far rather modest. The Eu-
roparties lack real independent authority as well as sufficient resources. Com-
bined with the institutional peculiarities of the European political system, this
explains the curious structure of the Europarty: a decentralized network -like
co-ordinating organisation, which allows horizontal contacts between MEPs,
European Commissioners and government leaders in the European Council as
well as vertical contacts between those people and the national party elites.57 In
other words, Europarties facilitate rather than represent - and this will last as
long as the member parties want this.
1. R.S. Katz/P. Mair, "The evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: The Three Faces of Party
Organization", in: S.B.Wolinetz, Political Parties, Aldershot 1998, 184.
2. O. Niedermayer, "Die europaischen Parteienbiinde'; in: O.W Gabriel/O. Niedermayer/R. Stoss
(eds), Parteiendemokratie in Deutschland,Wiesbaden 2002, 428-446.
3. G. van Oudenhove, The Political Parties in the European Parliament. Thefirst ten years (Septem-
ber 1952 - September 1962), Leiden 1965, 138.
4. S. Hix/U. Lesse, Shaping a Vision. A History of the Party of European Socialists, BruSSe!2002,
11,15; see also E. van Rooyen/G. Voerman, "Het einde van een tijdperk? De PvdA en het verlangen
naar Europese partijvorming", in: F.Becker/M. Hurenkamp/M. Sie Dhian Ho (eds), Het ongemak
over Europa. WBSjaarboek 2008, Amsterdam 2008,146-164.
5. Hix/Lesse, Shaping a Vision, 13-17·
6. D. Marquand, "Towards a Europe ofthe Parties", The Political Quarterly 49 (1978), 445.
7. Hix/Lesse, Shaping a Vision, 24.
8. Hix/Les:












































8. Hix/Lesse, Shaping a Vision, 28.
9. A. van Kessel, "Ruggen recht, herenf", Hoe de Nederlandse christen-demoeraten het tegenover
hun Duitse geestverwanten aflegden in het debat over het profiel van de Europese Volkspartij, Hilver-
sum 2003, 31, 71.
10. Van Kessel, "Ruggen recht, herenf", 90,151; J. Lodge/V. Herman, Direct Elections to the Euro-
pean Parliament: a Community Perspective, London 1982, 155.
11. Lodge/Herman, Direct Elections, 153.
12. K.M. Johansson, "European People's Party'; in: Idem/P. Zervakis (eds), European Political
Parties between Cooperation and Integration, Baden-Baden 2002, 57.
13. R.H. van de Beeten, "Christen-democratie of midden-rechts blok?'; Christen Democratische
Verkenningen 4 (1992),173.
14. Herman, Direct Elections, 157-158.
15. Johansson, "European People's Party'; 61.
16.D.L. Hanley, "The European People's Party: towards a new party form ?",in: Idem (ed.), Chris-
tian Democracy in Europe. A Comparative Perspective, London 1994, 194-195; Johansson, "Euro-
pean People's Party'; 56.
17. Johansson, "European People's Party", 70.
18. R. Hrbek, "Transnational links: the ELD and Liberal Party Group in the European Parlia-
ment'; in: E.J. Kirchner (ed.), Liberal Parties in Western Europe, New York 1988, 457.
19. Lodge/Herman, Direct Elections, 196.
20. Lodge/Herman, Direct Elections, 193, 207·
21. Hrbek, "Transnational links", 464; see also Lodge/Herman, Direct Elections, 207; C. Sand-
strom, "European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party", in: K.M. Johansson/P. Zervakis (eds), Eu-
ropean Political Parties between Cooperation and Integration, Baden- Baden 2002, 109.
22. Sandstrom, "European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party'; 120.
23. Hrbek, "Transnational links", 460, 468; see also Sandstrom, "European Liberal, Democrat
and Reform Party'; 101.
24. Lodge/Herman, Direct Elections, 207.
25. Lodge/Herman, Direct Elections, 171-186; Van Kessel, "Ruggen recht, herenf", 192.
26. P.Lynch, Minority Nationalism and European Integration, Cardiff 1996, 141-145.
27. T.M. Dietz, "European Federation of Green Parties'; in: K.M. Johansson/P. Zervakis (eds),
European Political Parties between Cooperation and Integration, Baden-Baden 2002, 125-139.
28. S. Hix, "The transnational party federations'; in: J. Gaffney (ed.), Political parties and the
European Union, London 1996,317.
29. Hix, "The transnational party federations'; 315 -316.
30. Ibidem, 317·
31. R. Ladrech, "The European Union and Political Parties'; in: R.S. Katz/W. Crotty (eds), Hand-
book of Party Politics, London 2006, 494.
32. Hix, "The transnational party federations'; 317.
33. K.M. Johansson/T. Raunio, "Regulating Europarties: Cross-Party Coalitions Capitalizing on
Incomplete Contracts'; Party Politics 11 (2005), 522.
34. Hix, "The transnational party federations'; 323; S. Hix/C. Lord, Political Parties in the Euro-
pean Union, Basingstoke 1997, 190.
35. Hix/Lesse, Shaping a Vision, 60; D.L. Hanley, Beyond the nation state: parties in the era of


















this will last as
alists, Brussel 2002,
jA en het verlangen
(eds), Het ongemak
36. R. Ladrech, "Party of European Socialists'; in: K.M. Johansson/P. Zervakis (eds), European
Political Parties between Cooperation and Integration, Baden-Baden 2002,86,91; Ladrech, "The
European Union and Political Parties", 494; Hix/Lesse, Shaping a Vision, 90-92.
37. Van RooyenlVoerman, "Het einde van een tijdperk?'; 146-164.
38. Johansson, "European People's Party", 58-59.
39. Ibidem, 60-61.
40. Ibidem, 56; Unlike the CSPECand the ELD (see below), the EPP initially had a system of
individual membership. However, because some parties felt that this left the back door open to
members of non-affiliated conservative parties, this loophole was closed in 1979; Lodge/Herman,
Direct Elections, 161-162.
41. Hanley, Beyond the nation state, 99.
42. Ibidem, 119
43. Sandstrom, "European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party'; 102.
44. Ibidem, 103.
45. Dietz, "European Federation of Green Parties'; 130, 134.
46. L. de Winter/M. Gomez- Reino Cachafeiro, "European Integration and Ethnoregionalist Par-
ties'; Party Politics 8 (2002) 485, 500.
47. S. Hix, "Parties at the European Level'; in: P.Webb/D.M. FarrellI. Holliday (eds), Political
Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, Oxford 2002, 301.
48. Hix, "Parties at the European Level'; 281-282.
49. S. Day/J. Shaw, "The Evolution of Europe's Transnational Political Parties in the Era ofEu-
ropean Citizenship'; in: T.A. Borzel/R.A. Cichowski (eds), The State of the European Union: Law,
Politics, and Society, Oxford 2003,157.
50. Johansson/Raunio, "Regulating Europarties".
51. Official Journal of the European Union, 15-11-2003,1.29711-4.
52. J.Ballance/S. Lightfoot, "The Impact of the Party Regulation on the Organisational Develop-
ment ofEuroparties" (www.leeds.ac.uk/jmce/dum_papr.htm). 14.
53. Ballance/Lightfoot, "The Impact of the Party Regulation", 12-13.
54. K.M. Johansson, "Toward a theory of federations of political parties in multilevel Europe: at
the nexus of international relations and comparative politics'; in: P. Delwit/E. Kiilahci/C. van de
Walle (eds), The Europarties. Organisation and influence, Brussels 2001, 31.
55. G. Moschonas, "The party of European Socialists: the difficult 'construction' of a European
player'; in: P.Delwit/E. KiilahcilC. van de Walle (eds), The Europarties. Organisation and influence,
Brussels 2001,118-121.
56. Ladrech, "The European Union and Political Parties'; 496.
57. P. DelwitiE. KUlahcilC. van de Walle, "The European party federations. A political player in
de making?", in: Idem, The Europarties. Organisation and influence, Brussels 2001,10.
